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I. INTRODUCTION
Excessive CEO compensation is the causa celebre of current corporate
law. 1 There is a great deal of popular interest in the coverage of perceived
compensation abuses that has fueled a veritable media feeding frenzy.2
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1. John Core, et al., The Power of the Pen and Executive Compensation I (May 23, 2007)
(working paper), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=838347 ("With the possible exception of
major accounting frauds . . . , there are few topics that are more pervasive and produce bigger
headlines in the business press than executive compensation.").
2. Id. at 14 (noting that for the 1994-2002 time frame, "[t]he number of compensation-related
articles grew rapidly from 325 to 3,263 ... an increase of about 900%. However, at the same time,
Reports about exorbitant severance payments to failed CEOs have only
served to concretize popular opinion about directors' laxity in exercising due
oversight to ensure that pay and performance are correlated, and have
strengthened calls for regulators to fill the void. The weak correlation of
pay with performance also seems to be symptomatic of larger corporate
governance problems.4 The Economist reported the results of a 2006 poll
showing that eighty percent of Americans thought that corporate executives
were overpaid.' Another survey targeting institutional investors, conducted
by Watson Wyatt, found that ninety percent of the respondents believed that
CEO compensation was excessive.6 A survey of corporate directors showed
that sixty-one percent of the respondents believed likewise.7  An
international survey of compensation in twenty-six industrialized countries,
conducted by the compensation consultancy Towers Perrin, showed that
the total number of articles across all topics grew from 216,677 to 825,887 ... an increase of about
280%").
3. In January 2007, SEC Commissioner Campos stated:
It seems that many boards truly do not understand the ramifications of their executive compensation
decisions, particularly as they relate to severance pay, pensions, and golden parachutes upon
termination without cause or a change in control. For example, there have been numerous public
reports that the NYSE's compensation committee was unaware of significant aspects of Dick
Grasso's pay. The Commission is trying to help in this regard. Generally speaking, I think the
breadth and specificity of our new executive compensation rules will have the effect of focusing
compensation committees on the details of executive compensation packages.
Roel C. Campos, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Remarks Before the 2007
Summit on Executive Compensation (Jan. 23, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech
/2007/spchO2307rec.htm. See also Sam Pizzigati, Soaring Executive Pay Attacked by Shareholder
Activists, CORPWATCH, June 26, 2007, available at http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=14533
("America's corporate boardrooms must step up to their responsibilities,' [] President [George W.
Bush] proclaimed to a business audience. 'You need to pay attention to the executive compensation
packages that you approve.").
4. Core, supra note 1, at 21 ("CEOs with a large number of compensation-related articles tend
to manage large, poor performing firms. Seven out of the ten firms have market capitalization of
$20 billion or more, and three-year market-adjusted returns are negative for all of the ten firms.").
5. In the Money, ECONOMIST, Jan. 18, 2007, available at http://www.economist.com/special
reports/displaystory.cfrn?story-id=8513949. An ISS Global Institutional Investor Study conducted
in 2006, found that respondents from the United States, Canada, Europe, and Australia listed
executive compensation as one of their main areas of concern. The study quoted a United States
respondent as saying, "Executive compensation is out of control .... The increase in executive
compensation over the last 10 years is not in correlation with the performance of companies.
Compensation committee members need to be held accountable." Institutional Shareholder
Services, 2006 Postseason Report: Spotlight on Executive Pay and Board Accountability, available
at http://www.riskmetrics.com/pdf/2006PostSeasonReportFfNAL.pdf.
6. Press Release, Watson Wyatt Worldwide, Institutional Investors Dissatisfied with U.S.
Executive Pay System, Watson Wyatt Study Finds (Dec. 13, 2005), available at
http://www.watsonwyatt.com/news/press.asp?ID=15518 (surveying fifty-five institutions managing
$800 billion in assets).
7. Press Release, Watson Wyatt Worldwide, Corporate Directors Give Executive Pay Model
Mixed Reviews, Watson Wyatt Survey Finds (June 20, 2006), available at
http://www.watsonwyatt.com/news/press.asp?ID=16180 (surveying fifty directors who serve on
corporate boards).
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U.S. corporate executives averaged compensation that was twice as much as
their French, German, and British counterparts, and approximately four
times that of their Japanese and Korean equals. 8
Such evidence has, no doubt, justified legislative measures like the
recent controversial legislation called "Say on Pay," which was passed in the
House of Representatives by a bipartisan majority of 269 to 134, 9 prompting
the rise of alarms about special interest capture.' 0 A similar bill awaits its
fate in the Senate. I" The community of institutional shareholders has
embraced the opportunity to have a say on pay, with the Council of
Institutional Investors, the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility,
Institutional Shareholder Services and Glass Lewis-all key players having
filed dozens of such resolutions in the 2007 proxy season-supporting the
new legislation.' 2 The say on pay resolutions introduced by institutional
investors and others were successful in several major companies like
Verizon and have averaged votes in excess of forty percent during the 2007
proxy season-no small feat for a debut proposal.1' These resolutions have
had an effect even when not adopted: faced with the prospect of a
shareholder vote, Aflac, a major insurance company, voluntarily embraced
8. Albert Hunt, Capitalistic Democracy: Let Shareholders Vote on CEO Pay, ST. PAUL
PIONEER PRESS, Feb. 2, 2007, at B6.
9. See Are You Ready for Regulations Requiring Shareholder Votes on Executive
Compensation: 'Say on Pay?,' http://blog.irmanager.org/?view=archives&month=7&year--2007
(July 6, 2007, 4:05); see also H.R. 1257, 110th Cong. (2007), available at http://www.house.gov/
apps/list/press/financialsvcs dem/shareholder.pdf.
10. Based on the experience of other countries where "Say on Pay" exists, such fears might be
unfounded. In the United Kingdom, which has had such a rule since 2002, there have only been
about eight instances where shareholders have voted down reports of the compensation committee.
Shareholders have not rejected any reports in the Netherlands. The experience has been similar in
Australia, except for one microcap firm in 2006. Institutional Shareholder Services, What
International Market Say on Pay: An Investor Perspective, http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/Say
OnPay.pdf.
11. S.1181, 110th Cong. (2007).
12. Stephen Davis, Does 'Say on Pay' Work? Lessons on Making CEO Compensation
Accountable, available at http://millstein.som.yale.edu/documents/Davis Say-On-Pay-Policy-
Briefing.pdf.
13. See Gretchen Morgenson, Say-on-Pay Gets Support at Verizon, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2007,
at Cl, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/19/technology/19verizon.html?ref=business
(discussing the passage of a pay-on-say resolution by a 50.18% majority); Posting of Jason Cowart
to POMTALK: The Blog for Institutional Investors, http://www.pomtalk.com/
pomtalk/executive-compensation/index.html (May 8, 2007, 21:38 EST) ("According to the
Institutional Shareholder Services, at least 40% of shareholders have voted yes on so-called "say on
pay" proposals this proxy season.").
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the measure, albeit at a delayed point (from 2009). 14 Other companies have,
however, opposed such measures. 15
The debate over the lack of correlation between CEO compensation and
performance has also caused a divide amongst corporate law scholars.
16
Proponents of intervention have predictably welcomed the legislative
activity and have called for more. 17 This article argues that the legislative
and regulatory interventions by the state are in furtherance of the expressive
functions of the law, and that even in the absence of sanctions such
expressive laws can have an effect on behavior. 18 It argues that while
legislative and regulatory actions can express certain norms, they are
ultimately unlikely to be of much help in behavior modification unless
accompanied by norm internalization. Decentralized deployment of non-
legal sanctions can offer a pathway to norm internalization in the CEO
14. Press Release, Aflac, Aflac Adopts Non-Binding 'Say On Pay' Shareholder Vote (Feb. 14,
2007), available at http://www.aflac.com/us/en/aboutaflac/PressReleaseStory.aspx?rid=962932.
15. Wells Fargo, for example, opposed the measure, stating that:
The proposed advisory vote would not provide useful guidance to the HRC [Human Resources
Committee] in considering its compensation philosophy and program or in making specific
compensation decisions because of the "up-or-down" nature of the vote. Such a vote would provide
no clear or meaningful guidance to the members of the HRC on specific components of the
Company's executive compensation program, nor would it allow for constructive feedback about the
program generally. The members of the HRC would be forced to speculate about which component
of executive compensation-salary, bonus, stock options, or retirement programs-is of particular
concern to the stockholders.
Wells Fargo, (Schedule 14A), at 94 (Mar. 16, 2007).
16. See, e.g., Lucian BE1CHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004); John E. Core et al., Is U.S. CEO
Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1142 (2005)
(reviewing LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004)); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation:
Who Decides?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1615 (2005); Linda J. Barns, The Overcompensation
Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling Executive Pay, 68 IND. L.J. 59, 67 (1992).
17. Professor Bebchuk argues that shareholder advisory votes on executive compensation would
"express the collective judgment of the shareholders about the quality of the company's pay
arrangements. An expression of widespread shareholder dissatisfaction would provide a valuable
signal to the board . . . [and publicity] would apply some pressure on the board to take the
shareholders' preferences into account." See Written Testimony Submitted by Professor Lucian A.
Bebchuk, William J. Friedman and Alicia Townsend Friedman Professor of Law, Economics, and
Finance and Director of the Corporate Governance Program, Harvard Law School: Hearing on
Empowering Shareholders on Executive Compensation Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services,
110th Cong. 4 (2007), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcsdem/ht
bebchuk03O8O7.pdf. He notes elsewhere that shareholder resolutions have been ignored. See
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARM. L. REV. 833, 877
(2005). Bebehuk also contends that "market forces are unlikely to impose tight constraints on
executive compensation. They may ... deter managers from deviating extremely far from arm's-
length contracting arrangements, but overall they permit substantial departures from that
benchmark." See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 16, at 58.
18. See infra Part IV.
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compensation area.' 9 Under this thesis, legislation only aids the deployment
of social sanctions by virtue of its expressive function.2 °
The claim advanced by some in the Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC) that the executive compensation regulations are value neutral (in that
they do not seek to make qualitative judgments about whether CEO pay is
excessive) is also reflective of the confusion about their expressive
function.2' Clearly, the SEC was not trying to increase disclosure because
disclosure by itself has some purpose in the abstract. Disclosure is only
valuable in terms of allowing shareholders to make determinations about the
correlation that compensation has with performance.22  Thus, the SEC's
regulations are really serving an expressive function by showing that pay
uncorrelated with performance should invite disapproval. To assume that
the regulations only require disclosure, and that the deliberate omission of
measures other than disclosure indicates an unwillingness to take any
position on the excessive compensation debate, ignores the social meaning
that the regulations change with regard to executive compensation. Au
contraire, there is an implicit assumption that behavior can be modified by
changing the social meaning of CEO compensation by crafting rules bereft
of direct intervention, merely by expressing popular opinion in a particular
direction.23 Popular opinion here seems to be, at its root, animated by
growing concerns about income inequality, albeit expressed in the CEO
compensation debate in terms of correlating pay with performance. The
social meaning that is sought to be conveyed could be that large, unmerited
payouts-vastly in excess of some unidentified, optimal compensation-are
undesirable. The SEC's regulatory action recognizes the futility of capturing
such a slippery idea in direct income redistribution fashion when the full
consequences of such action are unknown. Instead, it expresses the popular
19. See Henock Louis, Jennifer Joe & Dahlia Robinson, Managers' and Investors' Responses to
Media Exposure of Board Ineffectiveness (Sept. 2007) (unpublished working paper), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=714501. The authors write that there is evidence
that adverse Business Week coverage about institutional investors' perceptions of board effectiveness
has an impact on their taking corrective actions. Id. at 2-3. For example, boards identified as the
worst are more likely to replace CEOs. See id. at 4.
20. See infra Part IV.B.
21. See generally infra Part IV.
22. FILIPP NISENZOUN, THE CORRELATION OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND SHAREHOLDER
WEALTH (Jun. 10, 2003), available at http://www-econ.stanford.edu/academics/HonorsTheses/
Theses_2003/Nisenzoun.pdf.
23. See also Press Release, House Comm. on Fin. Servs., House Passes Executive Compensation
Reform (Apr. 20, 2007), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/financialsvcs-dem/press
042007.shtml ("Now, people have suggested that Congress is legislating salaries. We reject that.
The bill we have passed today does not intrude on the process of setting compensation.").
opinion and leaves the consequences to be determined at an individual actor
level. This is unlikely to work in the absence of the targets that internalize
the norm underpinning the regulations.
However, some scholars seem to suggest that mere disclosure would
have the effect of reducing CEO compensation.24 It is entirely possible that
rather than reducing compensation, CEOs will choose to structure their
compensation arrangements in different ways to frustrate the disclosure
rules. 25  To the extent that they cannot camouflage compensation in
advantageous ways, CEOs will resort to other measures, like seeking
employment in private companies or hedge funds. These are
consequentialist explanations.
Proponents of increased disclosure implicitly base their claims on the
behavioral reasons for CEOs hiding the true financial implications of their
compensation packages. 26 They claim that disclosure will produce
beneficial outcomes.27 In an influential book pointing out the failures of the
current legal regime, Bebchuk and Fried write that companies structure
compensation arrangements with large chunks going into post-retirement
payments and benefits to take advantage of weak disclosure obligations that
24. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management
Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225, 254 (1990) (arguing that "[t]he benefits of the public disclosure of
top-management compensation are obvious since this disclosure can help provide a safeguard
against 'looting' by management (in collusion with 'captive' boards of directors)").
25. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 16, at 95 ("As disclosure requirements for executive salaries,
bonuses, and long-term compensation have become stricter, firms have increasingly turned to
postretirement payments and benefits as ways to compensate managers."); see also id. at 102
("Deferred compensation is a second technique used to transfer large amounts of mostly
performance-insensitive value to executives without attracting much shareholder attention."); id. at
109 ("[C]onsulting contracts provide substantial value to retired executives. They usually offer the
retiring CEO an annual fee for 'being available' to advise the new CEO for a specified amount of
time per year. These consulting arrangements provide flat, guaranteed fees rather than payment for
work actually done."); Bainbridge, supra note 16, at 1615.
26. Empowering Shareholders on Executive Compensation: H.R. 1257. The Shareholder Vote
On Executive Compensation Act: Hearing on H.R. 1257 Before the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th
Cong. 67 (2007) (written testimony submitted by Professor Lucian A. Bebchuk, William J. Friedman
and Alicia Townsend Friedman Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance and Director of the
Corporate Governance Program, Harvard Law School) ("[P]ublic companies have consistently and
persistently provided compensation in forms designed to make the amount of compensation, and the
extent to which is was decoupled from performance, hidden or less transparent."); see also Lucian
Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues, 17 J. APP. CORP. FIN. 8,
17 (2005) ("[T]he information provided about deferred compensation arrangements does not allow
even the most careful analyst to estimate with any precision the value conferred on executives
through these arrangements.").
27. See Peter Huang, Regulating Irrational Exuberance and Anxiety in Securities Markets, in
THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR (Francesco Parisi & Vernon Smith eds.,
University of Chicago Press 2003), available at http://ssrn.con/abstract=474661 ("Mandatory
disclosures generate not only information, but also such emotions as perhaps anxiety,
embarrassment, euphoria, exuberance, feeling stupid, relief, or shame.").
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are required for these forms of compensation. 28 They claim that boards
"camouflage" rent extraction through the use of guaranteed retirement
pensions, deferred compensation, post-retirement perks, and guaranteed
consulting fees-all vehicles unrelated to the company's performance.2 9
They put forth a "managerial power" thesis to explain how the board's
monitoring function has been undercut by the concentration of power in the
hands of the management.30 It is revealing that even attempts by the SEC to
ensure that investors are informed about executive compensation agreements
have been stymied by corporations,3 1 perhaps owing to managerial power
being exercised in undesirable ways. The direct result of this sort of
concealment is that investors are unsure as to whether a particular
company's executive compensation package violates accepted norms,
cramping their ability to respond adequately. 32  A clear, single baseline
number that discloses the total compensation paid to a CEO will help to
create and enforce new norms by deploying social sanctions like shame to
keep CEO compensation roughly correlated to performance. Clear
disclosures will allow shareholders to determine whether compensation is
excessive, and to deal with any deviance from the norm. Clarity in
disclosure will also facilitate the creation of a secondary norm that would
put pressure on large institutional shareholders to engage in sanctioning
28. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 16, at 95.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 61-79.
31. The SEC Chairman said in a speech recently:
[W]e've reviewed the first of this year's crop, alarm bells are ringing. Already we're
seeing examples of over-lawyering that are leading to 30- and 40-page long executive
compensation sections in proxy statements. I have to report that we are disappointed
with the lack of clarity in much of the narrative disclosure that's been filed with the SEC
so far.
Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Closing Remarks
to the Second Annual Corporate Governance Summit (Mar. 23, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch032307cc.htm ("[T]he median length for the CD&As
was 5,472 words-over 1,000 words more than the U.S. Constitution. And the longest was more
than 13,500 words ... ").
32. Behavioral economics research shows that emotions motivate people to punish opportunistic
conduct. See Ronald Bosman & Fran Van Winden, Emotional Hazard in a Power-to-Take
Experiment, 112 ECON. J. 147, 147, 153-58 (2002). Studies show that subjects in experiments are
more likely to inflict punishment when they are angry. Id. There is also a demonstrable correlation
between the degree of anger and the willingness to incur costs in order to punish offenders. See id;
see also Dominique J.-F. de Quervain et al, The Neural Basis of Altruistic Punishment, 305 SCIENCE
1254 (2004). Studies also show that participants feel angrier the more money the other player took,
and the more concerned they were about fairness. See Bosman & Van Winden, supra, at 153-58;
M.M. Pillutla & J. Keith Mumighan, Unfairness, Anger and Spite: Emotional Rejections of
Ultimatum Offers, 68 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 208 (1996).
behavior. The creation of such a norm will facilitate the decentralized
enforcement that is necessary if expressive law is to succeed in behavior
modification. Large institutional investors that do not sanction will
themselves be the subject of sanctioning by other actors. This will motivate
them to incur the costs necessary for the primary targets of the expressive
law--corporate CEOs and directors-to be socialized to internalize the norm
underlying the law.
Part II of this paper will briefly describe the expressive function of the
law. Part III provides an overview of legislative attempts at serving this
expressive function. Part IV posits that expressive law cannot succeed in the
absence of norm internalization by CEOs and directors. This process of
internalization requires large shareholders to incur the costs of socializing
the relevant actors by leveraging the structural attributes of the corporate
system. Part V offers some conclusions.
II. THE ExPREssIvE FUNCTION OF THE LAW
The rich vein of inquiry unearthed by scholars working on social norms
theories has produced a welter of provocative writings on the expressive
functions of the law.33 Richard McAdams, who has made significant
contributions to this domain through his esteem-based theory on the
evolution of social norms,3 4 has propounded an attitudinal theory of
expressive law that is particularly well suited to the CEO compensation
debate. According to him, "law changes behavior by signaling the
underlying attitudes of a community or society. Because people are
motivated to gain approval and avoid disapproval, the information signaled
by legislation and other law affects their behavior."35 Central to this theory
is the idea that individuals do not possess perfect information about what
other individuals approve of.3 6  This lack of information constrains their
ability to act in ways that gain approval, and causes them to reward actions
33. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Linguistic Meaning, on linguistic "Expression" and the
Multiple Variants of Expressivism: A Reply Response to Professors Anderson and Pildes, 148 U. PA.
LA. REV. 1577 (2000); Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A
General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and
Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?,
63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 943 (1995); Jason Mazzone, When Courts Speak: Social Capital and Law's Expressive
Function, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1039 (1999); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of
Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law,
144 U. PA. LA. REV. 2021 (1996).
34. See generally Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Regulation, and Development of Norms, 96
MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997).
35. Richard McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339, 339-40
(2000).
36. Id.
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aimed at conveying this valuable information.3 7  If this is true, then,
McAdams claims that there is a positive relationship between laws enacted
by democratically elected representatives and popular attitudes because it
crystallizes the zeitgeist. 38 Ergo, the law can signal to individuals what the
popular attitudes are. 9 Under this scheme, it does not matter as to what (if
any), or how effective, the sanctions for the nonobservance of the law are.
Purely symbolic laws can work even without any sanction to compel
obedience. This might be for two reasons: first, individuals value the
approval of others as an intrinsic good; second, individuals might have
instrumental reasons for seeking approval.4 °
McAdams writes that while opinion polls can serve to help individuals
to identify an approval pattern, these mechanisms are fraught with
problems.4 1  Almost every poll is open to criticism of some sort-that
respondents were not appropriately chosen, that the size of the sample was
inappropriate, that the questions were not appropriately posed, etc.42
Further, the results of every poll are not known to the public.4 3  He also
writes that "pluralistic ignorance" might contribute to people not learning
what kinds of conduct invite approval or disapproval, because each person is
afraid of voicing their true opinion in the face of a perceived common
opinion that might be false or imagined.44
Law can step into such breaches and allow individuals to update their
beliefs about conduct that might help them to gain approval or avoid
disapproval. 45  The underlying basis for the law's ability to fill this
information gap pertains to the need for legislators to expend the effort
necessary to identify the zeitgeist. 46 They do not do this out of altruistic
37. Id. at 350.
38. Id. at 364 ("The broad claim is that this correlation exists whenever the legislation is
publicized.").
39. Id. at 350.
40. Id. at 369.
41. Id. at 355 n.41.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 356. Pluralistic ignorance is a state "in which virtually every member of a group or
society privately rejects a belief, opinion, or practice, yet believes that virtually every other member
privately accepts it." Id. at 356-57 (quoting Deborah A. Prentice & Dale T. Miller, Pluralistic
Ignorance and the Perpetration of Social Norms by Unwitting Actors, 28 ADVANCES
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 161, 161 (1996)). The author articulates several pluralistic
examples like the belief amongst college students that excessive drinking is acceptable, and that
violence is an acceptable response to insulting behavior amongst southern males. Id. at 357-58.
45. Id. at 359.
46. Id.
215
objectives, but purely out of rational self-interested motive, namely in order
to ensure their continuing popularity and reelection.47 McAdams writes that
legislators have no choice but to regard popular sentiment despite the
evidence of special interest and lobby group capture, because even diffuse
popular opinion can be harmful to politicians who choose to ignore it.
48
This is particularly true in cases where the issue is one that resonates widely
in the media and has extensive coverage.49 It will be well nigh impossible
for politicians to conceal interest-group capture in these situations, and there
is likely to be a backlash if their actions are contrary to the popular
opinion.50 McAdams argues that "populist legislation"--or laws "enacted
without having been championed by an interest group with a material stake
in the legislative outcome or where there were interest groups on both sides
of the legislative battle but the clearly weaker interest group won"5'-has a
particularly strong correlation with popular opinion.52  His principal
example is "symbolic legislation," which does not require any redistribution
or reallocation of resources; thus, there are no competing interest groups, "so
the outcome will be highly correlated with the number of voters who prefer
the 'symbol' being enacted., 53 Nonetheless, he does concede that the levels
of organization of the groups who want or dislike the symbol are a material
factor in the outcome. 54
Under the McAdams scheme, if legislation is correlated with popular
opinion, the converse is also true-that is, the lack of legislation is evidence
of the absence of belief amongst legislators that there is popular support on
that subject.55 This, in turn, helps to guide individual behavior. Consider a
simple example. A director is evaluating a proposal to award the CEO a
severance package that is three times his prior year's compensation. In
addition to considerations of merit, the director evaluates the reaction of
other individuals and wants to act in a way that does not invite their
disapproval. If the director concludes that a certain percentage of the
population needs to believe that the severance package is excessive in order
for the legislature to enact law against it, the fact that the legislature has not
so acted signals that the popular opinion does not regard the severance
package as excessive. 6 On the other hand, the existence of a law on the
47. Id.
48. Id. at 361.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 363.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 363 n.40.
55. Id. at 364.
56. Id. at 359 ("[I]f legislators cater to popular opinion then legislative outcomes provide signals
216
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topic signals the existence of popular opinion against severance packages
that are three times prior year's pay.17 Thus, the law conveys the message
that the appropriate threshold has been reached and allows the director to
vote for of against the proposal.58 This is independent of any sanction that
the law might impose.5 9 While this is a simplistic depiction of dynamic
forces, it is sufficient for our purposes that rational actors will assume that
the passage of legislation, despite the demands on legislative time, signals
the existence of popular opinion given the interest of legislators in getting
reelected.60  The expressive function of the law can also serve to address
common collective action problems, a point that is particularly salient in the
CEO compensation area because of the diffused nature of shareholders.6'
The very real signs of dissonance about executive compensation might
be evidence of pluralistic ignorance if buttressed by evidence that the
enactment of legislation is causing a change in beliefs. 62 This remains to be
seen given the infancy of the SEC's executive compensation disclosure
regulations, 63 and the pendency of the "Say on Pay" Bill in the Senate. 64 If,
however, the evidence of the United Kingdom and other countries that have
enacted such laws is anything to go by, there might be signs that there is a
change in belief caused by the law expressing a strong need to correlate pay
with performance and to curb executive greed.65 The previously held belief
that company directors had unfettered discretion in setting CEO pay, with
little regard for the welfare of shareholders, appears to have changed after
of what those legislators believe about public preferences.").
57. See id. at 367 ("Wherever there is a positive correlation between popular opinion and
publicized legislation, the individual will always update her beliefs in the same direction, believing it
to be more likely that there is a strong disapproval when the legislature has acted to prohibit the
behavior than when it has not.").
58. See id. at 365 ("New legislation causes individuals to update their prior beliefs about the
approval pattern.").
59. Id. at 339 ("A strict focus on sanctions, however, obscures how law can otherwise influence
behavior. Legal theorists sometimes posit that law affects behavior 'expressively' by what it says
rather than by what it does.").
60. Id. at 359 ("If voters turn out of office those who ignore or misjudge popular preferences,
then individuals with a comparative advantage at gathering and interpreting such information will
dominate legislative bodies.").
61. Cass Sunstein makes a similar point by giving various examples: "Insofar as regulatory law
is concerned with collective action problems, this is a standard idea, especially in the environmental
context, but also in the setting of automobile safety, occupational safety and health, and many other
problems as well." Sunstein, supra note 33, at 2031.
62. See supra notes 2, 3 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 43-59 and accompanying text.
64. See infra Part III.A.
65. See discussion infra Part IlI.B-D.
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the passage of such laws, if experts are to be believed.66 The enactment of
the legislation signaled the existence of popular opinion in favor of curbing
CEO pay,67 and in turn emboldened other actors like the Association of
British Insurers (ABI) to craft guidelines and policies with even greater
68restraints. 8 Before the passage of the legislation, agents like the ABI were
unlikely to have had confirmation that their beliefs were widely shared.
Further, the passage of the legislation signals to directors that they must take
the ABI Guidelines more seriously than they might have done in the absence
of the legislation.69 While McAdams does not expressly recognize this
effect, at least in the CEO pay context, it is clear that the ability of non-state
actors to leverage the law's expressive effect to carry the attitude farther is
crucial to its success. 7
In the CEO compensation arena, recent years have seen a marked
clamor for strong action at the governmental level.71  This might be, as
McAdams writes, because "people value symbolic government action ...
because it can change behavior., 72 One example is the protracted and often
vicious debate over abortion.73 In McAdams's view, there is a constant
struggle for leveraging the power of the state to change behavior by
"signaling attitudes. 74  Special interest groups that may also be norms
entrepreneurs leverage the expressive function of the law to achieve norm
creation or change by piggybacking on state institutions. 75 Their actions are
driven by their belief in the ability of the expressive function of the law to
strengthen social norms. 76 This strengthening occurs because "lawmaking
publicizes a societal consensus" which creates the "concrete [social] norms
that define compliance with internalized abstract [social] norms. 77
66. See Sunstein, supra note 61, at 2034 ("[L]aw might attempt to express a judgment about the
underlying activity in such a way as to alter social norms."); see also infra notes 239-253 and
accompanying text.
67. See infra note 201 and accompanying text.
68. See infra notes 164-203 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 201-03 and accompanying text.
70. See McAdams, supra note 34; McAdams, supra note 35, at 341 ("[If law has an expressive
effect on behavior, the expressive law offers interest groups another tool for achieving their ends.").
71. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
72. McAdams, supra note 35, at 381-82.
73. Id. at 382. ("Given a positive correlation between public attitudes and legislative action on
publicized matters of symbolic concern, the legislative condemnation signals disapproval of the
prohibited abortion method and, quite probably, abortion generally- When one side wins the
legislative battle, it signals that side's greater strength in numbers of adherents or the intensity of
their attitudes, either or both of which create greater social pressures for everyone to conform
publicly to that side's view.").
74. Id. at 341.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. McAdams, supra note 34, at 400.
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This phenomenon may have explanatory power in the case of the Say on
Pay Bill, aimed at giving shareholders a right to cast an advisory vote on
executive pay.7 8 Norms entrepreneurs are putting pressure on politicians to
adopt such measures because they want the law to express the social
consensus against excessive CEO compensation. 79 They believe that
successful passage of legislation demonstrates the existence of consensus
and concretizes the costs of nonconformity.80 The passage of the Bill also
might be owed to a signaling effect-politicians want to signal to their
constituents that they are working to advance their welfare, and by adopting
the agendas of norms entrepreneurs, they do precisely that.8 It might also
be dangerous for politicians with constituents who support the work of
norms entrepreneurs to be seen to be doing nothing. 82 They might be
exposing themselves to secondary social sanctions, and risk being seen as
people who are too cowardly to enforce the social norm, and hence
undeserving of reelection. 83 Norms entrepreneurs create conditions for the
birth of a secondary sanction for the enforcement of the underlying norm.
When the risk of this sanction attaches to powerful groups like politicians
who might otherwise free-ride, it advances the enforcement of the social
norm enormously. 84 This seems to be at the root of the legislative activity
against excessive CEO compensation.
78. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 10-12, 16 and accompanying text; see also McAdams, supra note 35, at 365
("After the passage of legislation, the correlation implies the presence of popular support.").
80. See McAdams, supra note 35, at 365.
81. Id. at 358-59 ("Because legislators have a professional interest in correctly judging approval
patterns, their enactments reveal their private information about such patterns.").
82. Abigail Barr, Social Dilemmas and Shame-Based Sanctions: Experimental Results from
Rural Zimbabwe (University of Oxford Centre for Study of African Economies, Working Paper No.
2001.11,2001), available at http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/workingpapers/pdfs/2001-11 text.pdf.
[S]anctions would be imposed upon non-cooperators by cooperators because by not
cooperating the former are preventing the latter from getting their fair share. If the
imposition of sanctions reduces the payoff to the sanctionee more than the payoff to the
sanctioner, cooperators can redress this imbalance by sanctioning non-cooperators.
Id. at 3. Barr writes that her experimental results "provide strong evidence that the shame-based
sanctions anticipated and imposed by the communities that took part in her experiments were
effective at promoting cooperation." Id. at 5. "Villagers in Zimbabwe clearly care about what other
people think of them and will modify their behavior in order to improve their status in the eyes of
their neighbours." Id. at 13; see also Ernest Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness,
Competition, and Cooperation, 114 Q. J. OF ECON. 817 (1999).
83. See McAdams, supra note 35, at 359 ("If legislators fear that frustrating popular sentiment
will cost them their jobs, then legislators have a strong incentive to invest in gathering information
about public practices.").
84. Laurent Denant-Boemont, Punishment, Counterpunishment and Sanction Enforcement
in a Social Dilemma Experiment (Aug. 2005), http://userwww.service.emory.edu/-cnoussa/
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1II. LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY
This section provides a brief overview of the various legislative efforts
aimed at curbing income inequality under the guise of the incontrovertible
plea that CEO compensation must be closely correlated to performance. The
legislative efforts were characterized by interest groups on both sides-with
institutional shareholders, pension funds, labor unions, and religious groups
supporting state intervention to curtail compensation, 5 while corporate
boards, CEOs, and industry groups, rallying against such legislation.1
6
While it is true that the latter class had the greater financial wherewithal,
more to lose by legislation, and hence more reason to engage in stinted
advocacy, the passage of legislation seems to reflect the view that there is a
groundswell of public support for the idea that CEO compensation is
excessive and that boards must do more to fulfill their monitoring
functions. 87 It might also be reflective of wider social concern about
growing income disparity, as well as negative emotions like envy and
jealousy. Otherwise, politicians who have much to gain from the rich and
powerful are unlikely to have supported the Say on Pay Bill in such
numbers. 88
A. Say on Pay
The Shareholder Vote on the Executive Compensation Act was passed
by the House of Representatives in 2007 as a response to the public demand
for intervention under the leadership of Representative Barney Frank.89 In
section two, the Act provides that proxies "shall permit a separate
shareholder vote to approve the compensation of executives" who are
Punishment%20202005.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2007) ("It is thus clear that, at least under some
circumstances, sanctioning mechanisms can represent an effective means of increasing cooperation
among individuals and thus alleviate free-rider problems.").
85. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 3, 5-7, 15 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
89. The CFA Institute's Centre for Financial Market Integrity conducted a survey which found
that "[seventy-six] percent of respondents support proposals that call for non-binding advisory
sharcowner votes on executive compensation plans... as part of the annual proxy process." Press
Release, CFA Institute, Advisory Pay Vote Gets Boost From Investment Professional
Group's Survey (Mar. 30, 2007), available at http://www.cfainstitute.org/aboutus/press/
release/07releases/20070330_02.html. However, it is interesting to note that most respondents
favored a market solution, rather than a legislative one. Id. There were 2,239 respondents to the
survey comprised of investment advisors and professionals. Kurt Schacht, managing director of the
CFA Institute's Centre, was quoted as saying, "[O]ur survey respondents strongly supported the
direct and proven mechanism of an advisory shareholder vote to express their views on the matter."
Id.
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subject to the SEC's compensation disclosure rules. 90 Under the statute, this
shareholder vote "shall not be binding on the board of directors and shall not
be construed as overruling a decision by such board." 9'
Recognizing the potential for windfalls that are paid to CEOs following
merger activity, the statute requires a merger proxy to "disclose in the proxy
solicitation material, in a clear and simple form in accordance with
regulations of the Commission, any agreements or understandings ... with
any principal executive officers" of the issuer "concerning any type of
compensation (whether present, deferred, or contingent) that are based on or
otherwise relate to the acquisition, merger, consolidation, sale, or other
disposition, and that have not been subject to a shareholder vote ... ,,92 In
the event that there are such agreements or understandings, these have to be
approved by a separate shareholder vote. 93 Once again, this vote is not
binding and is not to be treated as overruling the board.
94
As will be obvious when compared with the United Kingdom's
Regulations on Director Remuneration, 95 the Act does not go far enough.
Further, the other differences in corporate governance mechanisms between
the United Kingdom and the United States limit the ability of the Act to have
as powerful an impact. 96 As the American Federation of State, County, and
Municipal Employees (AFSCME) stated in testimony before Congress:
"In the U.K., which has both rights [majority voting for directors],
these shareholder powers are viewed much like soccer's yellow and
red card warning system. The advisory vote is the yellow card. A
large shareholder vote against a pay report is the yellow card
warning to the company board. If this warning is not heeded and
pay practices are not reformed and better aligned with performance,
90. See H. R. 1257, 110th Cong. (2007).
91. Id.; see also Press Release, House Comm. on Fin. Servs., House Passes Executive
Compensation Reform (Apr. 20, 2007), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/
financialssvcs-dem/pressO42007.shtml (last visited Sept. 20, 2007) (noting Representative Frank's
statement that "[t]his is a bill to further the workings of the capitalist system of the United States. It
has one very specific provision, it says that the shareholders, the owners of public corporations, will
be allowed to vote every year in an advisory capacity on the compensation paid to their employees
who run the companies").
92. See H.R. 1257, 110th Cong. (2007).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See infra notes 128-203 and accompanying text.
96. See infra notes 128-203 and accompanying text.
then shareholders have the opportunity to use the red card by
replacing failed directors." 97
It is this element of removal that tells compensation committee members
that they must be responsive to the concerns expressed by shareholders if
they wish to continue on the board.98 The absence of this feature seems to
explain the indifferent response by companies in the United States that have
seen say on pay proposals triumph despite opposition from management. 99
B. The SEC's Compensation Disclosure Rules
The SEC's new rules on the disclosure of executive compensation were
issued on the back of unprecedented interest, as evidenced by the
overwhelming number of responses to its request for comments. °° The
rulemaking was prompted by concerns that companies were not disclosing
compensation arrangements with clarity,10' and concerns that the market was
hindered by the lack of quality information on compensation.102
97. Hearing before the House Comm. on Fin. Servs. on H.R. 1257 The Shareholder Vote on
Executive Compensation Act, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Richard Ferlauto, Director of
Pension and Benefit Policy, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees).
98. Id.
99. One example is this statement from Verizon:
The board is committed to continuous review of the company's compensation practices and will
further consider its policies in light of the high level of shareholder interest and the active discussion
taking place with respect to the advisory vote issue in a variety of forums, including in the U.S.
Congress.
Plonline.com, GOVERNANCEBRIEFS: Restatements Panel Shouldn't be 'Disincentive,'
http://www.pionline.com/apps/pbcs.dl/article?AID=/20070528/REG/705250550/1030/TOC (last
visited Sept. 29, 2007). In response, AFL-CIO Secretary-Treasurer Richard Trumka said: "The
record vote by Verizon shareholders reflects the growing dissatisfaction by shareholders over
unregulated and excessive CEO compensation. The question remains: Will Verizon listen, respond
and reach out to investors, or will it continue the status quo despite the record shareholder vote
demanding change?" Verizon Shareholders Still Waiting to Have a Say on Pay, AFL-CIO Weblog,
http://blog.aflcio.org/2007/10/25/verizon-shareholders-still-waiting_tohave_a_sayonpay.
100. Press Release, Sec. Exch. Comm'n, SEC Votes to Adopt Changes to Disclosure
Requirements Concerning Executive Compensation and Related Matters (July 26, 2006), available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-123.htm [hereinafter Changes to Disclosure
Requirements]. SEC Chairman Christopher Cox said, "With more than 20,000 comments, and
counting, it is now official that no issue in the 72 years of the Commission's history has generated
such interest." Id.
101. Alan L, Belle, SEC Division of Corporate Finance Director, Remarks Before the Conference
of the NASPP, The Corporate Counsel and the Corporate Executive (Oct. 20, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch102004alb.htm. Alan L. Belle saw a pattern that disclosed "as
little as possible while seeking to avoid liability, rather than disclosure that seeks to inform." Id.
102. Changes to Disclosure Requirements, supra note 100 ("Investors have made it clear that
disclosure about executive compensation and related matters is very important to them. The rule
changes and guidance the Commission today voted to approve will significantly improve the quality
and usefulness of the information that investors receive about executive compensation," said John
W. White, Director of the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance).
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As per the rules, disclosure of compensation must now be provided in
detailed tabular form in addition to a narrative component.0 3 It mandates
the inclusion of a new report, called the compensation discussion and
analysis (CD&A)-a principles-based overview, much like the MD&A that
has been part of financial statements for many years--containing "a
discussion and analysis of the material factors underlying compensation
policies and decisions reflected in the data presented in the tables."' 04 The
CD&A should provide an explanatory context to the tables and detail the
elements of the company's compensation, showing: (1) the objectives of the
compensation program; (2) the actions the company rewards through the
compensation program; (3) the component parts included in the
compensation program; (4) the rationale supporting component parts; (5) the
rationale behind the sums allocated under each component; and (6) how the
choices surrounding the components correspond to the objectives of the
compensation package as a whole.'0 5 The CD&A also has to disclose the
company's policies with regard to the timing of granting equity
compensation awards. 106 Thus, if a company spring-loads its options grants,
that must be disclosed under the rules.'0 7 Correspondingly, if a company
grants options following the revelation of negative information (bullet-
dodging), that must be disclosed too. 0 8 A separate report is expected to be
filed by the compensation committee, similarto that furnished by the audit
committee.'0 9 The CD&A, tables, and the narrative portions are to be
treated as "soliciting material" and have to be "filed" with the SEC by the
company. "10
The consequence of this requirement is that the disclosure of CEO pay
information will now be a company report that is certified by the
management, rather than furnished by the compensation committee of the
103. Executive Compensation, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2007).
104. Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 6542, 6544 (Oct. 5,
2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2006/33-8732a.pdf [hereinafter Executive
Compensation and Related Party Disclosure].
105. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402. This could include a discussion of: the policies underlying decisions to
allocate compensation between current and long-term compensation; the allocation of payments
between cash and non-cash compensation, such as stock and stock options; benchmarking of
executive compensation packages; and the involvement of executives in the compensation process.
Id. at 6546.
106. Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure, supra note 104, at 6556-57.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 6550.
109. Id. at 6585.
110. Id.
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board."' The significance of this requirement is that it creates liability for
misstatements under the Exchange Act." |2  The compensation committee
only "furnishes" its report, rather than "filing" it. "13 This is curious given
that the underlying objective is to ensure that the board exercises due
oversight in approving CEO compensation. It might have been more
sensible to require the compensation committee to file the report rather than
the management. There is already what some would call excessive
management entanglement in compensation issues, and the requirement that
they file the report only adds to this.
Companies are expected to provide a Summary Compensation Table
that details the compensation paid currently or deferred for the last fiscal
year and the two prior fiscal years. 114 This must include options, restricted
stock, and compensation consisting of current earnings or awards that are
part of a plan.' ' 5  The Summary Compensation Table has to contain a
bottom-line number of total compensation. 116 In an attempt to capture items
that are particularly susceptible to concealment, the "all other compensation"
column is meant to list perquisites and personal benefits," 7 excluding things
that are of a de minimus (less than $10,000 in the aggregate) nature."' The
idea is that such disclosure will unwrap "stealth compensation" and expose it
to public scrutiny. "9
111. Id.
112. Id. at 6556-57.
113. Id. at 6544 n.43 ("Unlike the current requirements under which both the [compensation
committee] report and the graph . . . need only be furnished to the Commission, the proposed
narrative disclosure, along with the rest of the proposed executive officer and director compensation,
would be company disclosure filed with the Commission.").
114. Id. at 6547-48 ("This table ... would show the named executive officer's compensation for
each of the last three years, whether or not actually paid out."). A narrative discussion would follow
the table to disclose material information needed to understand the presentation in the tables. Id. at
6548. The two supplemental tables should break down and explain information from the summary
table, which provides better clarity about the elements of additional compensation. Id. at 6547.
115. Id. at6547.
116. Id. at 6548 ("[R]equiring that all compensation be disclosed in dollars and that a total of all
compensation be provided").
117. Id. at 6551. The test for inclusion rests on whether the item is "integrally and directly
related" to the executive's job, and it would include items "such as use of company-provided aircraft,
yachts or other watercraft, commuter transportation services, additional clerical or secretarial
services devoted to personal matters, or investment management services." Id. at 6553. This
disclosure is on the aggregate incremental cost to the company, rather than the market value of such
perquisites. Id. at 6554.
118. Id. at 6551. Companies would be required to disclose perquisites and personal benefits if
they aggregate to $10,000 or more. Id. This requirement also adds footnote disclosure that
specifically identifies the perquisites or personal benefits and requires valuation of those valued at
greater than $25,000, or ten percent, of the perquisites. Id. at 6553 n.108.
119. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jessie M. Fried, Stealth Compensation via Retirement Benefits, I
BERKELEY Bus. L. J. 291, 323-24 (2004); Lucian Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Executive Pensions,
30 J. CORP. L. 823, 827-31 (2005).
224
[Vol. 35: 207, 2008] Say on Pay
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
The rules also deal with severance payments." 0 Despite the fact that
there had been several shareholder proposals that called for boards of
directors to adopt a policy that would limit golden parachute arrangements
received by executives in the event of a change in control or severance for
any reason, the SEC's rules do not take a position on golden parachute
payments unlike the United Kingdom situation.'21 Watson Wyatt reported
that fifteen of twenty such proposals studied received a majority vote,
cementing the common-sense idea that golden parachute payments in these
change of control situations are unrelated to performance, and that in many
cases, they only result in empire building at the expense of consumers and
shareholders. 1
22
A table disclosing director compensation is also required because of the
growth of more complicated director compensation packages, which often
include company stock and incentive plans.123 This is perfectly reasonable
because CEO pay is not negotiated in a vacuum and can have implications
for director compensation. 1
2 4
Other tables that are required under the rules include Grants of Plan-
Based Awards and Outstanding Equity Awards at Fiscal Year-End.12 5 These
tables require extensive disclosure of vesting schedules and option prices of
120. Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure, supra note 104, at 6560-63. First,
companies will disclose estimated annual retirement payments under defined benefit plans that an
executive officer is currently, or will become, entitled to upon retirement. Id. at 6560-61. Second,
companies will disclose data regarding nonqualified defined contribution and other deferred
compensation plans. Id. at 6561. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, companies will now be
required to disclose in narrative form arrangements with executives for payments in the event of
"resignation, severance, retirement or other termination, ... a change in his or her responsibilities, or
a change of control of the company." Id. at 6562.
121. See THE ROCK CENTER FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AT STANFORD UNIVERSITY,
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION DISCLOSURE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE SEC'S PROPOSED NEW RULES 74-
75 (Apr. 3, 2006), available at http://www.gob.stanford.edu/cldr/pdfs/jabrundfest9763.pdf
[hereinafter EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION DISCLOSURE].
122. Id.
123. Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure, supra note 104, at 6564-65; see also
National Association of Corporate Directors, Report of the NACD Blue Ribbon Commission On
Director Compensation (2001) (discussing the large amount of companies that offer equity as a pay
boost).
124. Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure, supra note 104, at 6571-82. The
Commission anticipates that companies will broadly disclose certain transactions-including
indebtedness-with related persons, where the amount exceeds $120,000. Id. at 6572. Furthermore,
corporate policies and procedures for related-party transactions would also be subject to disclosure.
Id. at 6576. That disclosure will be consolidated with other existing disclosure items related to
corporate governance, such as director independence. Id. at 6577.
125. Id. at 6588.
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specific awards.1 1 6 The rules also require a Pension Benefits Table and a
new Non-Qualified Deferred Compensation Table. Under the rules,
companies have to disclose potential payments in the event of change in
control, under the various scenarios of terminations of employment-i.e.,
fired without cause, death, or disability. 1
27
C. United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, companies have been required to provide
shareholders with an advisory vote on compensation since 2002.12' The
Directors Remuneration Regulations were the result of a consultation
exercise undertaken by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). 129 The
Regulations must be seen in the backdrop of the infamous instance of Cedric
the Pig. 3" Following the privatization of the major utility company British
Gas, the CEO (Cedric) was paid GBP 300,000 per year, at a time when job
cuts and layoffs were impending. 3' The labor unions engaged in a public
campaign that fueled public anger and capped their efforts by letting loose a
pig named Cedric at the annual general meeting of the company. 2 This had
spectacular results, and the CEO was forced to resign. 133 A similar attempt
in the United States at Home Depot, whereby a person attended the meeting
dressed as a chicken, had less success.1
3 4
Under the United Kingdom regulations, companies are required to
provide shareholders with a remuneration report for them to vote on. 35 The
126. Id.
127. Id. at 6550, 6554.
128. See Director's Remuneration Report Regulations 2002, at 234B, available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2002/20021986.htm; see also Jonathan Baird & Peter Stowaser,
Executive Compensation and Disclosure Requirements: the German, UK, and US Approaches,
GLOBAL COUNSEL, Oct. 2002 at 32, available at http://crossborder.practicallaw.com/jsp/binary
Content.j sp?item=: 323309.
129. The purpose of the regulations was to: (1) enhance transparency in setting directors' pay; (2)
improve accountability to shareholders; and, (3) provide for a more effective performance linkage.
See Report on the Impact of the Director's Remuneration Report Regulations, http://www.
deloitte.com/dtt/article/0,1002,side%253D284%252cid%253D71779,00.html (last visited Oct. 5,
2007).
130. See EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION DISCLOSURE supra note 121, at 118-19; see also Christine
Buckley, Monday Manifesto: Paul Kenny, THE TIMES, Sept. 10, 2007, http://business.
timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry-sectors/ support-services/article2419122.ece (last visited
Oct. 5, 2007); Showdown time at the AGM, THE TIMES, Apr. 20, 2003, Stephen Davos, Does "Say
on Pay" Work? Lessons on making CEO Compensation Accountable, 1622 P.L.I. 47.
131. See EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION DISCLOSURE, supra note 121, at 118-19.
132. Buckley, supra note 130; Davis supra note 12, at 47.
133. Buckley, supra note 130.
134. Home Depot Shareholders Blast CEP Over Pay; Nardelli Cuts Criticism Short, USA
TODAY, May 25, 2006, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/companies/managment/2006-
05-25-nardellix.htm?csp=34.
135. See Baird & Stowaser, supra note 128, at 32; see also Director's Remuneration Report
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regulations are similar in effect to the Say on Pay Act because shareholders
can only demonstrate disapproval by their vote, which does not affect the
validity of the remuneration policy itself.1 36 The remuneration report must
include salaries, fees, bonuses, expenses, compensation for loss of office and
other benefits paid to a director. 37 With regard to severance payments, the
language in the Regulations is rather broad, stating that "any other payments
paid ... in connection with the termination of qualifying services" have to
be disclosed. 38 Similarly, with regard to retirement related payments, the
regulations require disclosure of pension payments.1 39 In the case of defined
benefit schemes, a company must disclose changes in accrued benefit, the
transfer value, and the amount obtained (the current transfer value minus
previous year's transfer value and any contributions made by the
individual). 40 This allows the assessment of the benefit obtained under the
scheme and the cost to the company. 141
The regulations recognize the need to allow shareholders to correlate
pay with performance, and accordingly, require a graph showing the total
shareholder return (TSR) of the company and of a peer group over a five-
year period.' 42 The weakness in the rule is that the directors themselves
decide the peer group of companies, and it is entirely possible that they
would choose a peer group that represents their performance in a favorable
light. While there is a requirement that the board justify its choice of the
peer group, this could be easily satisfied. 43 Further, the peer group can be
changed, again facilitating the cherry-picking of favorable companies for
inclusion.
Strangely, although the Regulations require disclosure of peer groups
against which the company assesses performance for options to vest or
become exercisable, this peer group does not have to be the same as the one
Regulations, supra note 128, at 7A Section 241A(3).
136. See Baird & Stowaser, supra note 128, at 35; see also Davis, supra note 12, at 71.
137. See Baird & Stowaser, supra note 128, at 33; see also Director's Remuneration Report
Regulations, supra note 128, at 7A Section 234B 3-4.
138. See Baird & Stowaser, supra note 128, at 33; see also Director's Remuneration Report
Regulations, supra note 128, at 7A Section 234B 6(d)(ii).
139. See Baird & Stowaser, supra note 128, at 33; see also Director's Remuneration Report
Regulations, supra note 128, at 7A Section 234B 12.
140. See Baird & Stowaser, supra note 128, at 33; see also Director's Remuneration Report
Regulations, supra note 128, at 234B 12(2).
141. See Baird & Stowaser, supra note 128, at 33; see also Director's Remuneration Report
Regulations, supra note 128, at 234B 12(2).
142. Director's Remuneration Report Regulations, supra note 128, at 9.
143. Id. at 5.
used in the performance graph.' 44 The company must also explain the
reasons for choosing performance conditions and summarize the methods
used for assessing those conditions. 145 In the event that there are changes
made to performance conditions, these must be explained as well. 146 If the
company has no performance conditions, reasons must be provided for this
departure. 14' The Regulations also require audited disclosure of options
granted, exercised and lapsed, including exercise prices, market prices and
other information relevant to showing how much profit was made by the
director.I48 The Regulations seem to be looking at options purely from the
perspective of the recipient of the options and not from the perspective of the
cost to the company in granting them.
Companies are required to disclose the names of any individuals who
may have advised or provided services to the committee, with the objective
of unearthing potential conflicts of interest that might arise. 149 For example,
disclosure would be required in the work of compensation consultants who
might be amenable to pro-management suggestions in exchange for lucrative
business in other areas.
Despite the perceived potential for director manipulation, the
Regulations do come with some teeth: all directors of a company that fail to
comply with the provisions regarding the remuneration report-whether
ignoring its contents or failing to vote upon it-will be guilty of an offense
punishable by a fine. 50
Contrary to fears expressed by some, the Regulations have proven
effective, and shareholder revolts have been rare. I' The Regulations,
however, started off with a bang, perhaps explaining the surrounding anxiety
at their outset. Shareholders at Glaxo revolted by rejecting the remuneration
144. Id. at 27.
145. Id. at 6, 28.
146. Id. at 7.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 14.
149. Id. at 5.
150. Id. at 2-3. The Regulations state: (1) The directors of a quoted company must prepare a
directors' remuneration report for each financial year of the company; (2) In the case of failure to
comply with the requirement to prepare a directors' remuneration report, every person who (a) was a
director of the company immediately before the end of the period for filing accounts and reports for
the financial year in question, and (b) failed to take all reasonable steps for securing compliance
with that requirement, commits an offense; (3) A person guilty of an offense under this section is
liable (a) on conviction on indictment, to a fine; (b) on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding
the statutory maximum. Id.
151. STEPHEN DEAN, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVS., WHAT INTERNATIONAL MARKETS
SAY ON PAY: AN INVESTOR PERSPECTIVE 3 (2007), http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/SayOnPay.pdf.
ISS cites Ian Greenwood of Hermes Equity Ownership Services Ltd., as saying that there was not a
single instance of special interests hijacking the agenda. Id. at 12. Similarly, in Australia, according
to ISS, there was only one example of attempted (but failed) special interest hijacking. In the
Netherlands, there have similarly been negligible attempts of that nature. Id.
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committee's report, marking the first time for such an event in British
corporate history. 5 2  Although the margin of defeat was small, it had a
powerful impact on the corporate landscape. 5 3  The anger of shareholders
appeared to be directed primarily at the severance arrangements offered to
CEO Jean Paul Gamier whereby he would receive two-years' salary and
bonuses, in addition to other payments-all of which added to about GBP
twenty-two million. 5 4  Following the outcry, Glaxo had to reduce the
severance package such that it was a multiple of one-year's pay, and
introduce a new total shareholder return performance condition that was
measured against a peer group of global companies. 5 5  Recognizing the
public relations disaster, Glaxo increased its engagement with shareholders
and consulted with institutional investors and shareholder groups. 156 One
scholar writes that the introduction of:
"say on pay," and in particular the GlaxoSmithKline board's jolting
defeat in 2003, produced a virtual overnight increase in the level of
dialogue between companies and funds. Directors have shown a
strong interest in avoiding the prospect of individual and collective
reputational damage resulting from significant shareholder
opposition .... The Association of British Insurers (ABI) estimates
that contacts initiated by companies before they finalize
compensation plans tripled. 1
57
The most recent high-profile example of a shareholder revolt was at
United Business Media, which involved a special GBP 250,000 bonus to the
company's CEO Lord Hollick for ensuring a successful transition to the new
CEO David Levin.'58 This gave the shareholders an opportunity to exercise
152. 1d. at 5.
153. Id.; see also Stephen M. Davis, Testimony before the Comm. on Fin. Servs. of the United
States House of Representatives on Empowering Shareholders on Executive Compensation: H.R.
1257, the "Shareholder Vote on Compensation Act" (Mar. 8, 2007), http://www.house.gov/
apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs dem/htdavis030807.pdf ("Beforehand, we paid the CEOs what we
wanted to and told investors who objected 'too bad,"' recalled one former board member. But the
Glaxo loss "concentrated the mind wonderfully. Now the board must base remuneration on
performance and be scrupulous about it.").
154. DEAN, supra note 151, at 5.
155. Id. at 8-9.
156. Id. at 15.
157. Davis, supra note 12.
158. Sundeep Tucker, Hollick Humiliated by Rejection of £250,000 Bonus, FINANCIAL TIMES,
May 12, 2005, http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/suprepage.ft?newsid=fto051220050111009228.
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their rights under the Regulations and voice displeasure. 5 9 Almost seventy-
six percent of the shareholders of United Business Media voted against the
2004 remuneration report, and Lord Hollick was forced to give up the
special bonus. 160
The United Kingdom situation has been aided in large measure by the
strong role played by institutional shareholders like the Association of
British Insurers (ABI), which have a strong corporate governance agenda.
The ABI's "Executive Remuneration-ABI Guidelines on Policies and
Practices" has significant influence as another source of norms against
excessive CEO pay.' 6' The Institutional Voting Information Service (IVIS),
which is the monitoring wing of the ABI, performs a vital oversight function
by examining the remuneration reports of companies and providing guidance
to investors.162 In the interest of better public understanding, it operates a
color coded rating system: blue represents companies that comply with ABI
Guidelines and corporate governance best practices; amber represents
companies that provide cause for concern; red represents companies that are
non-compliant or inconsistent with Guidelines, signaling a potential vote
against the report; and finally, green represents companies that have been
previously labeled inconsistent or non-compliant but which have taken
corrective action and resolved the issues raised. 16
3
The ABI's Guidelines lay out several principles. First, "[b]oards are
responsible for adopting remuneration policies and practices that promote
the success of companies in creating value for shareholders over the longer
term."l64 The remuneration policies should be "demonstrably aligned with
the corporate objectives and business strategy .... ,165 Additionally, the
Guidelines require that compensation committees are to be comprised of
independent directors (although not exclusively) with the understanding that
there must be a dialogue with shareholders on compensation discussions. 166
With regard to the setting of CEO pay, the Guidelines state that the objective
159. Id.
160. Id. There was sustained media pressure following the vote in the face of reluctance by Lord
Hollick to give up the money. Id. A major institutional investor, Association of British Insurers
(ABI), was at the forefront of the pressure tactics, with its head of investment affairs being quoted as
saying: "The company's owners have spoken. If Lord Hollick insists on keeping the payment, then
he will be remembered for defying 76 per cent of shareholders-and not for his good performance as
chief executive." id.
161. ABI Guidelines, Executive Remuneration-ABI Guidelines on Policies and Practices,
(2006), http://www.ivis.com.uk/pages/gdsc2.1 pdf [hereinafter ABI Guidelines].
162. See generally Institutional Voting information Service, http://www.ivis.co.uk (last visited
Sept. 25, 2007).
163. Id.
164. ABI Guidelines, supra note 161, at 4.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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should be to "retain and motivate, based on selection and interpretation of
appropriate benchmarks."' 167  Further, CEO pay should be "linked to
individual and corporate performance through graduated targets that align
the interests of executives with those of shareholders." 168 The final principle
requires that "[s]hareholders will not support" compensation which "entitle
executives to reward when this is not justified by performance." 169
Section 1 of the Guidelines requires compensation committees to
structure pay in a way that is correlated with performance by using a mix of
incentives and base compensation.' 70 It is the committee's responsibility to
ensure that the performance objectives are clearly communicated to
shareholders in order for them to exercise their oversight functions
adequately. 17  They are also responsible for selecting a peer group of
companies for the purposes of comparison in order to judge performance. 172
Particular regard is to be had to ensure that windfalls are not provided to
executives at the expense of shareholders. 173 In language that is very salient
in cases where the initial expectations are not realized, as in the case of
Disney, the Guidelines state that the committee should "consider legal
redress where performance achievements are subsequently found to have
been significantly misstated so that bonuses and other incentives should not
have been paid." 174
With regard to the payment of bonuses, the Guidelines require that these
only be paid for meeting certain set performance criteria. ,7' The Guidelines
seem to frown on the payment of bonuses or incentives that are "transaction
167. Id. "Such benchmarks should be used with caution, in view of the risk of an upward ratchet
of remuneration levels with no corresponding improvement in performance." Id.
168. Id. at 4.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 5. Compensation committees are "responsible for ensuring that the mix of incentives
reflects the company's needs, establishes an appropriate balance between fixed and variable
remuneration, and is based on targets that are stretching, verifiable and relevant." Id. Further,
Section 2 states: "Remuneration Committees should recognise the impact that pension arrangements
can have on the mix between fixed and variable pay. In setting an appropriate balance, they should
bear in mind that pension entitlements may represent a significant and potentially costly item of
remuneration that is not directly linked to performance." Id. at 7.
171. Id. at 5.
172. Id. Compensation committees "should ensure that remuneration levels properly reflect the
contribution of executives and be rigorous in selecting an appropriate comparator group." Id.
173. Id. They should "guard against unjustified windfalls and inappropriate gains arising from the
operation of share incentive schemes and other associated incentives." Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
bonuses."' 7 6 In a significant departure from the Regulations, the Guidelines
seem to require prior shareholder approval for payments to executives that
are ex-gratia.'77 Share-based incentives must be specifically approved by
the shareholders, and the Guidelines stipulate that the vesting period must be
at least three years. 78  Discounted options are also forbidden by the
Guidelines, even though they recognize the desirability of executives having
a meaningful stake in the company's stock. 179 There is particular emphasis
on full disclosure of options payments because they traditionally tended to
be opaque, both in terms of cost to the company and their correlation to
performance. 180  It is not sufficient that any performance conditions are
set-they must be challenging and stretching the company's financial
situation in order to enhance shareholder value.' 8' The key language in
respect to challenging performance conditions is that they "relate to overall
corporate performance," and that they "demonstrate the achievement of a
level of financial performance which is demanding and stretching in the
context of the prospects for the company and the prevailing economic
environment in which it operates."'' 82  The Guidelines also recommend
sliding scale grants rather than "single hurdle" ones, as the former are better
from the company's perspective.8 3  Option grants that exceed annual
compensation by a multiple of one must only be made following higher
levels of performance. 184  In measuring performance, remuneration
committees must choose peer groups of companies which are "both relevant
and representative."' 85 In determining performance, the key metric is "total
shareholder return," with the caveat that the compensation committee must
176. Id. at 6 ("Shareholders are not supportive of transaction bonuses .... ").
177. Id. ("Any material payments that may be viewed as being ex-gratia in nature should be fully
explained, justified and subject to shareholder approval prior to payment.").
178. Id. at 10 ("[S]hare-based incentives or any substantive changes to existing schemes
should be subject to prior approval by shareholders by means of a separate and binding
resolution . . . . Vesting should . . . be based on performance conditions measured over a period
appropriate to the strategic objectives of the company. This will not be less than, and may exceed,
three years.").
179. Id. at 10 ("[S]hareholders consider it inappropriate for chairmen and independent directors to
receive incentive awards geared to the share price or corporate performance that would impair their
ability to provide impartial oversight and advice.").
180. Id. at II ("Disclosure should, inter alia, cover performance conditions and related costs and
dilution limits as set out in the relevant sections below. The reasons for selecting the performance
conditions and target levels, together with the overall policy for granting conditional share or option
awards, should be fully explained to shareholders.").
181. Id.
182. Id. at 12.
183. ld. at 13.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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ensure that it is "a genuine reflection of the company's underlying financial
performance, and explain their reasoning."1
8 6
Any payment of base compensation that exceeds the median has to be
justified. 187  Recognizing the possibility that certain performance targets
might involve confidentiality claims, the Guidelines only require that
general performance targets are revealed initially. 188 When the bonuses are
paid upon reaching the targets, however, these must be fully disclosed. 89 In
the event that payments were made based on performance subsequently
found to be misstated, the Guidelines urge remuneration committees to claw
back the payments that were made.'9 0 Companies are required to abstain
from providing tax relief to executives for matters pertaining to the taxation
of pension payments. 19'
The most important provisions are arguably those dealing with
termination payments. The Guidelines stress a contractual link between pay
and performance and are against automatic payments on termination when
there is no correlation to performance.' 92 Such automatic payments have
caused a blight on the system, and appear to be based, in part, on assuaging
the feelings of directors who might be disinclined to terminate the CEO for
nonperformance. This is clearly at the expense of the shareholders and
appears to have little justification. The Guidelines require the committee to
pay particular attention to the structuring of contracts, so that there is no
payment for nonperformance.' 93  Further, contractual language should
include the duty of the terminated executive to find other employment so as
to mitigate the company's duty to pay. 194 The Guidelines also frown on
liquidated damages payments. 195 The notice period also has to be reduced in
186. Id.
187. Id. at 6.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 7 ("Following payment of the bonus, shareholders will expect to see a full analysis in
the Remuneration Report of the extent to which the relevant targets were actually met.").
190. Id. ("Remuneration Committees should retain discretion to reduce or reclaim payments if the
performance achievements are subsequently found to have been significantly misstated. Where
there is doubt Remuneration Committees should work with the Audit Committee to ensure the basis
of their decision is correct.").
191. Id.
192. Id. at 8 ("The treatment of bonuses should be clear and a contractual link established between
variable pay and performance. In the event of early termination there should be no automatic
entitlement to bonuses or share-based payments.").
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
the event of termination. 196 The DTI commissioned a study by Deloitte &
Touche to examine the implementation of the Regulations.' 97 This study
found that there was a "rapid and almost complete reduction in directors'
notice periods to one year or less."'198  Payments made to executives on
severance are also frowned upon, although this might have the effect of
disincentivizing change in control transactions.'9 9 It is likely, however, that
the fiduciary duties required of boards will be an adequate check.
Perhaps owing to the DTI's Regulations and the ABI's Guidelines,
executive compensation growth appears to have slowed in the United
Kingdom.200  The Deloitte Report on the impact of the Directors'
Remuneration Report Regulations, published in November 2004, confirms
this.2 ' The study found that over seventy percent of shareholders believed
that the regulations had significant impact on board attitudes and
behaviors.20 2 There have been suggestions that United Kingdom companies
regard votes against a remuneration committee's report above a threshold of
twenty percent as affecting reputation in a negative way, and this has
contributed to a culture of listening to shareholders at an early stage in the
process. 203 If this is true, it emphasizes the importance of social sanctions in
buttressing the expressive functions of the law and suggests that a better
understanding of how the two interact is crucial in tailoring optimal
outcomes.
196. Id.
197. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF THE DIRECTORS' REMUNERATION
REPORT REGULATIONS: A REPORT FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY,
http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/filel 3425.pdf (Nov. 2004).
198. Id. at 6. The study also found that companies have all but eliminated severance provisions
exceeding one year's basic salary. Id. at 27. Among FTSE 100 companies, the percentage of
executive directors with twenty-four-month notice periods fell from thirty-two percent in 2001 to a
mere one percent in 2004. Id. at 19. Correspondingly, among executive directors of the FTSE 250,
the percentage fell from twenty-five percent in 2001 to five percent in 2004. ABI Guidelines, supra
note 161, at 8.
199. ABI Guidelines, supra note 161, at 8 ("Contracts should not provide additional protection in
the form of compensation for severance as a result of change of control.").
200. New Bridge Street's study of executives' basic salaries at Britain's largest 100 companies
showed a rise between five and six percent in 2006, to a median of 785,000 ($1.5 million). ISS
International Research Analysts, Improving Pay Practices, RISK & GOVERNANCE BLOG,
http:/blog.riskmetrics.com/2006/09/improving-pay-practicessubmitt.html. This compares favorably
with annual increases of about fourteen percent before the Regulations were in force. See also
Davis, supra note 12, at 22 ("The average annual increase has slowed in the last four years to
between 5 and 11% for CEOs, according to studies conducted recently by Manifest, New Bridge,
PIRC and RREV.").
201. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, supra note 197.
202. Id.at2l.
203. Davis, supra note 12, at 22.
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D. Other Countries
Australia followed the lead of the United Kingdom in 2004 by passing
the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and
Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004, which enacted section 250R(2) in the
Corporations Act 2001, and mandated that all companies give their
shareholders the ability to vote on the remuneration report at the Annual
General Meeting. 2 4 Like the United Kingdom legislation, this vote is also
nonbinding in effect. 205 The passage of the Act appears to mirror the kinds
of feelings about the lack of transparency and correlation to performance
that were cited in other jurisdictions prior to legislative action.20 6 Section
300A of the Act details the kinds of disclosures that are mandated. It
requires, inter alia, that the policy pertaining to compensation disclose:
detailed information about the performance conditions for the payment of
compensation, with explanations for the choice of those conditions; details
about the compensation of each director and the top-five highest
compensated executives; distinction between performance-related and non-
performance related payments; and the value of options granted.20 7
The reforms have had an impact similar to that achieved in the United
Kingdom. 8 There is greater interaction between management and key
shareholder groups ahead of the meeting to avoid the possibility of negative
votes. 20 9 An Australian survey in 2006 found that forty percent of corporate
executives believed directors should take notice of shareholder concerns if a
remuneration report receives a ten-percent negative vote. 2 10 The triggering
point was twenty percent for another forty-eight percent.2 11 This also shows
the importance of social sanctions.
204. Larelle Chapple & Black Christensen, The Non-Binding Vote on Executive Pay: A Review of
the CLERP 9 Reform, at 1 (Jan. 30, 2005) http://www.law.usyd.edu.au/-parsons/CLTA/Chapple
Paper.pdf.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 2.
207. Id. at 6-7.
208. See Davis, supra note 12; see also What International Markets Say on Pay, An Investor
Perspective, ISS, (Apr. 2007), available at http://issproxy.com/pdf/SayOnPayWP.pdf [hereinafter
International Markets] ("There is general consensus among U.K., Dutch and Australian investors
that shareholder votes on pay have tightened pay-for-performance links and reduced the risks of
rewards for failure.").
209. Chapple & Christensen, supra note 204, at 10-11.
210. Robert Yates, Focus on Pay Marks Australian Proxy Season, ISS GOVERNANCE WEEKLY,
Feb. 10, 2006.
211. Id:
Australia offers similarities with the United Kingdom in terms of
supporting roles played by industry groups, notably the Australian Stock
Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council.2"2 It issued the Principles
of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations in
2003, in the aftermath of corporate governance failures.21 3 In order to
promote adoption of the Best Practice Recommendations, the stock
exchange's listing agreement was amended requiring all listed companies to
include in their annual reports a statement about the extent to which they
follow the recommendations. 1 4 In 2007, the Council issued a revised
version of the Recommendations following a consultation process.25
There is some support for the view that corporate abuses motivated
actors to seek expressive law to signal displeasure over excessive CEO pay.
Professors Hill and Yablon give several examples demonstrating public
outrage over pay that was perceived to be unrelated to performance.21 6
Other countries have gone to greater lengths to curb CEO pay. The
Netherlands requires that the compensation policies of Dutch companies be
put to a binding vote at general meetings of shareholders.1 7 This is a
marked departure from the non-binding nature of the advisory votes in the
United Kingdom and Australia. ISS writes that, "[i]n the Netherlands,
shareholder votes have made remuneration committee members more
concerned about their reputations, more interested in the views of
shareholders, and more aware of the consequences of compensation
plans., 2 8 Norway stopped short of following the Dutch model and passed
recent legislation that gives shareholders an advisory vote on
compensation.219
212. The council was formed in 2002 to represent twenty-one different industry and stockholder
groups. Australian Securities Exchange, The ASX Corporate Governance Council,
http://www.asx.com.au/supervision/governance/corporate__governance-council.htm (last visited
Nov. 26, 2007).
213. Jennifer Hill & Charles Yablon, Corporate Governance and Executive Remuneration:
Rediscovering Managerial Positional Conflict, 25 UNSWLJ 294, 296 (2002); David Ablen,
Remunerating Fairly and Responsibly, 25 SYDNEY L. REV. 555 (2003).
214. Australian Securities Exchange, ASX Listing Rules, Chapter Four, Periodic Disclosure, Rule
4.10.3, available at http://www.asx.com.au/ListingRules/chapters/Chapter04.pdf
215. Australian Securities Exchange, Principles of Good Corporate Governance,
http://www.asx.com.au/supervision/governance/principles-good-corporate-governance.htm (last
visited Nov. 26, 2007).
216. Hill & Yablon, supra note 213, at 297-300.
217. International Markets, supra note 208, at 7.
218. Id. at 11.
219. Id. at 7.
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IV. EXPRESSION OF NORMS THROUGH LAW
The remarkable similarity in legislative and regulatory activity across
very different legal systems suggests that key constituencies are at work to
express certain norms through the law. At its core, the rhetoric implies that
the underlying concern is about the sheer size of executive pay rather than
achieving correlation with performance. The repeated references to CEO
greed and the extent of disparities with average worker pay, suggest that the
animating purpose is the expression of a norm against excessive wealth.
This is an attractive idea to politicians because it helps them win votes,
which might explain their willingness to enact legislation. Does the passage
of legislation aimed at expressing such a nebulous idea serve any purpose?
Would the mere passage of legislation establish a norm? The answer to both
questions must be in the negative. It is certainly the case that the evidence
of convergent action in several countries along similar lines shows that
actors are passing laws expressing similar values. The expectation is that
these laws will signal to CEOs and directors that greed is frowned upon, and
will thus cause them to behave more responsibly. While this makes sense
under McAdams' theory, it does not account for the obvious lack of impact
if individuals fail to update their beliefs following the publication of the new
norm by the passage of legislation.220 It is certainly the case that some
individuals will need nothing more than the passage of the legislation to
change their behavior. However, there will be others who refuse to follow
the law because they see the lack of sanctioning power, and/or because they
challenge the version of the norm that was supposedly expressed. In these
sorts of instances, it is quickly apparent that a mere desire for approval will
not result in conformity. Why, then, do actors clamor for expressive law? A
partial explanation might be their overestimation of the ability of expressive
law to modify behavior without any sanctions.
In order for the expressive law to work, the underlying norm that is the
basis for the law must be internalized. Such internalization might be the
result of introspection and deep change within one's own self, or it might be
a product of the actions of others following the passage of the law. One
explanation of the actions of those who champion expressive laws against
excessive CEO compensation might be that they hope to persuade more
passive actors to facilitate norm internalization by applying pressure on
offenders.
220. See McAdams, supra note 34.
237
These "champions" first hope to change the meaning of individuals'
actions through the passage of the law.221 While certain conduct may have
been tolerated before the passage of the law, by expressing a certain popular
opinion or consensus, the law signals a changed meaning to the conduct,
thus altering the way in which the conduct is now regarded. 2  This is
irrespective of the fact that the law itself has no sanctioning power. 3
Individuals attribute a different meaning to the conduct because of the law's
expressive function.224 Thus, compensation that was entirely unrelated to
performance might have been frowned upon as being undesirable from a
corporate governance standpoint, but with the passage of the Say on Pay Act
and the SEC's executive compensation regulations, its meaning has been
changed to one of deviance. That this deviance is not punished by the law is
irrelevant to this determination. 5 This changed social meaning is the
product of the law's expression of an attitude that is supposedly the popular
opinion, and it can change again depending on the legislature's recognition
of a different consensus over time.226 While the popular opinion subsists,
the champions hope that individual actors might undertake enforcement of
the expression of the law through the use of social sanctions.227
If individual actors have to engage in conduct that is aimed at enforcing
the law's expression because the law itself does not carry with it a sanction,
it is conceivable that the diffused and proliferate nature of the enforcement
might pose problems.228 One problem might be an excess of "outrage.'22 9
221. See Sunstein, supra note 61, at 2022.
222. See id. at 2026 ("[1f the law mandates recycling, perhaps it will affect social norms about the
environment in a way that is different from (and better than) the way curbside charges might affect
norms.").
223. See id. at 2027 ("A society might identify the norms to which it is committed and insist on
those norms via law, even if that consequences of the insistence are obscure or unknown.").
224. See id. at 2028 ("[T]he close attention American society pays to the Court's pronouncements
is connected with the expressive or symbolic character of those pronouncements. When the Court
makes a decision, it is often taken to be speaking on behalf of the nation's basic principles and
commitments.").
225. See id. at 2027, 2029-30.
226. Id. at 2022 ("[T]he social meanings of lighting up a cigarette, or engaging in an act of sexual
harassment, or using a condom, or refusing to eat meat, are very different in 1996 from what they
were in 1966, because of dramatic shifts in underlying norms.").
227. Id. at 2029-30; see also supra note 33.
228. See generally Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L.
REV. 1880(1991).
229. Id. at 1930. A similar point is made by Harel and Klement:
[lI]t is particularly important to notice that increasing the rate of detection decreases the deterrent
effects of shaming since it increases the number of shamed individuals in the society and, as was
shown earlier, such an increase decreases the expected costs of shaming due to the larger search
costs it imposes on law-abiding individuals. Conflicting effects may of course outweigh this effect.
ALON HAREL & ALON KLEMENT, THE ECONOMICS OF SHAME: WHY MORE SHAMING MAY DETER
LESS 15 (Aug. 24, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=789244.
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If outrage is frequently required, it will quickly cease to have much
impact. 30 This consequence would be counterproductive for those who
championed the expressive law.3 If, for example, a law was passed to
express disapproval of tattoos, but the numbers of individuals with tattoos
were to become large, people are likely to ignore the message of the law.
This could cause the very norm that is sought to be enforced to lose its
potency, and eventually its very status as a norm. 232 In the context of
tattoos, this is precisely what has transpired. Harel and Klement write that
the loss of potency creates a dissonance between the law's disapproval of the
illegal act, and the willingness of individuals to overlook it. 233 Increasing
the rate of sanctioning may therefore fail not only in substituting for
traditional sanctions' deterrent functions, but also in reinforcing the
community's cooperation with the law.234  Thus, an increased rate of
sanctoning may paradoxically undermine the law's expressive value.235
While the problem of an excess of outrage has some merit given the size
of the market, it is not insurmountable. Besides, the enormous growth in the
population over the last four decades, 236 and the consequent increase in the
numbers of those committing crimes, has resulted in an excess of traditional
punishments too. 237  Given the rather small number of actors with the
wherewithal to engage in enforcement actions of any significance, the
prospect of confusion is small if some actors attain credibility and demarcate
segments or industry segments for their work.238
230. See Massaro, supra note 228, at 1930-31 ("[S]haming overload . . . could reduce public
interest ... and thereby lessen the deterrence impact.").
231. See HAREL & KLEMENT, supra note 229, at 21.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 21-22 ("Shaming penalties can be 'self destructive' as an extensive use of them may
erode their effectiveness.").
236. See Blaine Harden, America's Population Set to Top 300 Million, WASH. POST, Oct. 12,
2006, at AOl.
237. See DAVID A. ANDERSON, THE DETERRENCE HYPOTHESIS AND PICKING POCKETS AT THE
PICKPOCKET'S HANGING 3 (Mar. 2000), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=214831.
238. For a discussion concerning the problems of identification due to overload, see Massaro,
supra note 228, at 1931 ("The primary problem with a dramatic increase in the number of
shamings ... would not be the initial cost of implementing or monitoring shaming punishments, but
the practical problem of how to measure and respond to changes in public reactions to the shaming
of one million offenders a year. For example, the court would need to assess whether and when the
public would begin to ignore this flood of information. Public curiosity at first might be high, but
likely would not endure." (emphasis in original)).
239
A. Decentralized Enforcement of Expressive Law
The successful enforcement of the norms underpinning expressive law is
closely related to the deployment of decentralized enforcement tools.
239
There is now a rich array of literature on social norms 240 that sheds light on
the expressive dimensions of labeling conduct as prosocial or antisocial. 24'
This scholarship could provide insights for the CEO compensation debate
because of its emphasis on the relationship between norms and the law.
Some norms theorists argue that law interacts with social norms by
strengthening them, and thus facilitates prosocial behavior.2 42 They bolster
their case with examples of laws that succeeded primarily because of non-
state enforcement.243 Norms theorists in the economics tradition posit that a
change in the law can inspire a change in preferences.244 This, in Sunstein's
words, is the "expressive" function of law.245 Other norms scholars focus on
the role of the law in effecting changes in social meaning.246 They write that
239. See generally Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L.
REv. 349 (1997); Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms of) Order in the Inner City,
32 LAW & SOC'Y. REv. 805, 812 (1998).
240. See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 33; McAdams, supra note 34; Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of
Groups: The Influence of Legal and Non-Legal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
133 (1996); Richard A. Posner, Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach, 87 AM. ECON.
REV. 365 (1997); Sunstein, supra note 33, at 95. Owing to the number of scholars at the University
of Chicago doing this work, some have referred to it as the "New Chicago School." See, e.g.,
Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661 (1998).
241. See McAdams, supra note 34, at 341-42.
242. See generally Robert Cooter, supra note 33.
243. Id. at 592. Scholars write that nonsmokers were emboldened by the passage of laws against
smoking in public areas to sanction smokers and this made the law more successful than it could
have been given the low potential for state enforcement. Robert Cooter has written that, though laws
against smoking in public are almost never enforced, compliance is widespread, suggesting that
labeling the behavior as a crime will heighten potential violators' fear of social sanction and might
also encourage a real increase in social sanctions against violators. See Robert Cooter, Do Good
Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Forms, 86 VA. L. REv. 1577,
1590 (2000) ("[P]osting 'no smoking' signs in U.S. airports has improved the quality of indoor air
with little or no legal enforcement."); see also Cooter, supra note 33, at 593-96 (discussing the
effects of enacting a law without enforcing it); Mark J. Horvick, Note, Examining the Underlying
Purposes of Municipal and Statewide Smoking Banks, 80 IND. L.J. 923, 924 (2005) (arguing that the
primary reasons smoking bans exist is "to impose social norms on smokers").
244. See Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 217,
230-34 (1993).
245. See generally Sunstein, supra note 33.
246. One example of this idea is the broken windows theory, whereby fixing broken windows has
a positive effect on crime rates by showing potential offenders that the neighborhood is unlikely to
tolerate untidiness, much less criminal behavior. See Kahan, supra note 239, at 351 ("Cracking
down on aggressive panhandling, prostitution, open gang activity and other visible signs of disorder
may be justifiable . . . since disorderly behavior and the law's response to it are cues about the
community's attitude toward more serious forms of criminal wrongdoing."). For further description
of the broken windows theory, see Richard Morin, A Crack in the Broken-Windows Theory, WASH.
POST, Jan 30, 2005, at B05.
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the law's signaling effect facilitates pro-social behavior.247 In this model, by
attaching a legal sanction to conduct, the law seeks to evoke displeasure and
social condemnation. These feelings generate social punishments that
supplement the deterrent effect of the punishments created by the
legislation.2 48 This helps to put a lid on otherwise profitable behavior and
generates positive outcomes for society. 49
Decentralized levying of social sanctions in aid of expressive law can
only work to curb CEO pay if the relevant actors have internalized a norm
against excessive greed. This is indeed a tall order and, in the absence of
internalization, no amount of excessive law can achieve the desirable
outcome. There is scant evidence that the champions of expressive
legislation in the United States have articulated (or even considered)
pathways to facilitate norm internalization. They seem to believe that
expressive law alone will achieve desired outcomes, and that their work
stops with the passage of legislation. Indeed, norm internalization is harder
than legislation. Our most basic norms are internalized over several years,
primarily through parenting and socialization. The latter avenue is perhaps
all that is available in the case of corporate CEOs and directors.
Socialization might be achieved in this case through repeated engagement at
vital stages of the compensation process. This engagement must necessarily
occur before company meetings in order to be effective.
The evidence from countries like the United Kingdom and Australia
with successful Say on Pay legislation suggests that some such process of
socialization is at work. There is frequent consultation with large
institutional shareholders prior to annual meetings. Large institutional
shareholders act in consort, enhancing their ability to socialize the relevant
actors. Further, the publication of best practices and guidelines for corporate
boards to follow in setting CEO pay serves to educate and socialize the
relevant actors to adhere to certain norms that are expressed by the law.
Socialization also suppresses conflicting norms from displacing the
norm championed by the expressive law. In the executive compensation
247. See Kahan, supra note 239, at 350-51. "Given the power of social influence, laws that shape
individuals' perceptions of each others' beliefs and intentions, for example, may often turn out to be
the most cost-effective means of deterring crime." 1d. at 351.
248. See I.J. Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, The Corporate Governance Role of the Media 4-5
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 543, 2002), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=335602 (arguing that adverse media coverage can hurt the reputations of
directors within their communities and impose social costs that extend to their families).
249. See McAdams, supra note 34, at 340-41; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social
Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 903, 904-14 (1996).
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case, the conflicting norm could be that "greed is good." If CEOs and
directors are not socialized against imbibing this norm, the expressive law
remains a dead-letter. McAdams seems to supports this view, arguing that
dissonance between law and social norms makes enforcing laws against
antisocial conduct difficult. 250 Yet, he does not offer an approach that would
facilitate norm internalization.
The structural constraints that corporate actors face might suggest
pathways for norm internalization to support expressive law.2 11 Of
necessity, corporate actors have to belong to groups, whether they are
boards, stock exchanges, or professions. The structural processes of these
groups present ideal mechanisms for socialization and norm internalization.
Given that membership, whether it be on a board or in a profession, is vitally
important if an individual desires to be a participant, the conditions of
membership and the threat of disciplinary actions that could culminate in
expulsion from the group, are powerful motivations for norm
internalization. 2 2 If long-term consequences must be faced if certain norms
are not internalized, rational actors will choose to internalize the norm rather
than forgoing benefits that flow from membership over a period of time.253
B. The Cost of Decentralized Enforcement
If expressive law depends on decentralized enforcement for its success,
it is important to understand the motive forces for the enforcers to engage in
sanctioning behavior. To be sure, inflicting any kind of sanction is costly.25 4
250. McAdams, supra note 34, at 348.
251. Jeffery J. Rachlinski, The Limits of Social Norms, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1537, 1545 (2000).
252. Id. Another motivation, according to McAdams' esteem theory, is that people have a
preference for something that other people can give or withhold at zero cost: esteem. McAdams,
supra note 35, at 343. The assumption serves to avoid the collective action problem of norm
enforcement. Because esteem is costless it is not subject to a free rider problem. Although the
preference for esteem is assumed to be slight, McAdams shows that it can explain even very costly
norm-guided behavior. Id. at 342. If acceptance is its own reward, then people will behave in ways
aimed at attaining acceptance, even in the absence of other rewards, and even in the presence of
other costs.
253. Rachlinski, supra note 251.
254. Richard A. Posner, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 211 (1981); Doron Teichman, Sex, Shame
and the Law: An Economic Perspective on Megan's Laws, 42 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 355, 363 (2005)
("In the context of SORNLs, for example, these costs include setting up notification websites,
updating these websites, tracking down offenders, and actively notifying communities."). Teichman
points out:
Non-legal sanctions are unique because through their use, the government can externalize
some of the costs of sanctioning to the public. The amount of sanctions inflicted can
therefore be raised without tapping into a limited government budget. Not only is this
true both of the costs of non-legal sanctions, which are quite obviously born by the
sanctioning public, but is also true with respect to the costs of inducing non-legal
sanctions.
Id. at 364 n.38.
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Even in the McAdams' esteem model,2 55 the very act of withholding esteem
is not as costless as he suggests.25 6 The enforcer is not free from costs just
because he or she only withholds esteem--disesteem might trigger
unfriendly retaliation.257 The enforcer of the sanction, even a relatively
passive sanction such as shunning or avoiding the wrongdoer, still has to pay
a price.258 These costs span the range from direct confrontation to mutual
avoidance at social occasions. 2 9 Regardless of the specific form, there is
little doubt that there is a cost-the measure of the enforcer's position post-
sanction, relative to the enforcer's position pre-sanction. In addition to this
cost, the enforcer must also factor in the possibility of free-riding.26°
In balancing the cost, the enforcer must also consider the benefits that
may accrue. 26' This could range from bragging rights to awards from
prestigious entities. 262  In addition, by participating in enforcement, the
enforcer could also, in some circumstances, be trying to stave off a sanction
against passivity that other enforcers might impose. 263 This sanction might
take the form of the passive person being labeled a coward, being shunned
as a person without a strong moral core, and so on.264 There are instances of
255. The esteem model has traction in the CEO compensation context because people with high
self-esteem are more likely to respond to the withholding of esteem. See Renee M. Jones, Law,
Norms, and the Breakdown of the Board: Promoting Accountability in Corporate Governance, 92
IOWA L. REV. 105, 139 (2006).
256. Teichman, supra note 254, at 359 n.16.
257. Id. at 358-59.
258. Julia A. Houston, Sex Offender Registration Acts: An Added Dimension to the War on Crime,
28 GA. L. REV. 729, 732-33 (1994) (pointing out problems of implementing SORNLs associated
with their costs). Denise M. Bonilla & Joy L. Woodson, Continuing Debate Over Megan's Law:
Some Question Whether Sex Offender List Curbs Crime. The State Statute is Set to Expire Next
Year, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2003, at B2 (describing the California Attorney General's position that
verifying registration would cost the state fifteen to twenty million dollars, which is a "hefty request"
given the California budget deficit).
259. Teichman, supra note 254, at 359.
260. McAdams, supra note 35, at 352-53.
261. Id. at 372-73.
262. Id.
263. This is the idea behind the signaling theory postulated by Eric Posner, whereby people are
either "co-operators" who have a low discount rate, or "cheaters," who have a high discount rate.
Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals and Social Norms in Politics and the Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 765,
768 (1998). Co-operators and cheaters all play repeated games in which the former maximize their
payoffs by interacting among themselves. Id. To exclude cheaters, co-operators can use costly
signals that only individuals who expect the high cooperative payoff can afford to send. Id. at 769.
The cost incurred by the sanctioning party is exactly what makes the infliction of the non-legal
sanction a credible signal. Id. at 768. People who are passive are seen to be non-co-operators and
are excluded from profitable interactions with co-operators. Id. at 770.
264. See id. at 768-70.
people who do not participate in consumer boycotts being punished in
various ways, apparently exemplifying the fact that passivity may not always
be costless.2 65 This secondary sanctioning is vitally important in persuading
reluctant individuals to incur the costs of enforcement.166  It discourages
free-riding and spreads the cost of enforcement more evenly.
At the average individual level, rather than sophisticated rational choice
analysis, people are motivated to enforce norms based on reciprocity. In
other words, people want to do unto others as has been done to them.
Experimental results from ultimatum games show that people pay a
monetary cost to punish people who have treated them in ways that they
perceive to be deserving of punishment.2 67  Reciprocity also allows
participants in repeated games to maximize their personal payoffs. 268 While
reciprocity in bilateral situations seems intuitive enough, the evidence
suggests that reciprocity is transferable; people view injustices perpetrated
on others as if they had been perpetrated on themselves, and they punish the
offender. 269 One example is the anti-Nazi boycotts during World War 11.270
Thus, enforcers might be willing to sanction greedy CEOs and directors who
approved their compensation packages regardless of the fact that they do not
own shares in the corporations that lost money because of these agreements.
It suffices that other shareholders were treated badly by these CEOs and
directors. Reciprocity can be a powerful tool if large institutional
shareholders can work together-it allows them to deploy their considerable
voting power in an enhanced form. This can facilitate norm internalization,
as directors can be excluded from boards if they fail to internalize the norm.
Given how valuable membership is, the rational self-interested director will
internalize the norm, thus contributing to the success of the expressive law.
265. Teichman, supra note 254, at 360 n.25.
266. LAURENT DENANT-BOEMONT ET AL., PUNISHMENT, COUNTERPUNISHMENT AND
SANCTION ENFORCEMENT IN A SOCIAL DILEMMA EXPERIMENT 3 (Aug. 2005),
available at http://userwww.service.emory.edu/-cnoussa/Punishment%20August%202005.pdf
("Because individuals who administer sanctions bear the cost of doing so, while all players benefit
from the resulting increase in contributions, there is an incentive for individuals to free ride on
others' provision of sanctions against low contributors.").
267. Werner Guth et al., An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J. ECON. BEHAV.
& ORG. 367 (1982). See also RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE 21-35 (1992); Ernst Fehr
& Armin Falk, Psychological Foundations of Incentives, 46 EURO. ECON. REV. 687, 689-704
(2002); Werner Guth, On Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments-A Personal Review, 27 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 329 (1995).
268. ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 27-54 (1984) (showing how a
reciprocal strategy can lead to higher payoffs for a player in a repeated prisoners' dilemma).
269. See Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, 59 J. BUS. S285,
S290-S292 (1986). The results of the experiment were clear-seventy-four percent of the players in
the second round chose to sacrifice their monetary well-being in order to sanction individuals that
treated other players unfairly. Id.
270. William Orbach, Shattering the Shackles of Powerlessness: The Debate Surrounding the
Anti-Nazi Boycott of 1933-41, 2 MOD. JUDAISM 149, 161-66 (1982).
244
[Vol. 35: 207, 2008] Say on Pay
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
V. CONCLUSION
The persistent cries for legislative intervention to curb excessive CEO
pay can be explained as a process of certain actors employing the law to
express an asserted norm. The law in almost every instance considered in
the above pages does not carry any significant legal sanctions. The passage
of the law was aimed primarily at expressing and cementing a norm that pay
be correlated to performance, 271 and that shareholders have a greater role in
compensation matters.272 The idea is that behavior will be modified in
desirable ways as the relevant actors update their notions about behavior that
invites approval and disapproval.273
The expressive function of the law alone may not suffice in achieving
behavioral change. Market actors are frequently ahead of the law, and it is
perfectly conceivable that compensation will be structured in newly invented
ways that protect the status quo.274 Some have even contended that the
enhanced disclosure will result in an increase in compensation across the
board, and will actually be counterproductive. 275 This is rather far-fetched.
The disclosure only effectively makes transparent to investors the
information that is already in the possession of the various compensation
276consultants that are parasitic to the process of negotiating pay agreements.
If the information unearthed by the enhanced disclosure comes as news to
these compensation consultants, it is further proof that they are probably of
little use in the first place.
The expressive function of the law will only be served by additional
enforcement actions taken at the delegated level. This must come from
institutional shareholders in the CEO compensation arena. These actors
have possessed the very tools that the Say on Pay Act essentially creates-
the ability to demand a shareholder vote, and the ability to withhold votes
from directors-for several years without employing them effectively. All
271. See David R. Francis, Congress Pecks Away at CEO Pay: Legislation Would Give
Shareholders a Formal Say in Executives' Compensation Packages, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,
Apr. 30, 2007, available at http://www/law/harvard.edu/prgrams/olin-center/ corporate-govemance/
MediaMentions/04-30-07_CSMonitor.pdf.
272. See Sarah Johnston, "'Say on Pay" Bill Passes House Committee, CFO.com, Mar. 29, 2007,
available at http://www/cfo.com/article.cfm/8946280/c_2984311/.
273. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
274. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 272.
275. See Mark J. Loewenstein, The Conundrum of Executive Compensation, 35 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 1,23-24 (2000).
276. See generally Claude Solnik, Executive Compensation Consultants Coming Under Fire For
Potential, LONG ISLAND Bus. NEWS, Jun. 2, 2006, available at http://findarticles.com/
p/articles/miqn4189/is_20060602/ai-n 16459901.
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that the statute does is make it mandatory for all companies to provide such
votes. 277 Institutional shareholders could have achieved this result on their
own in many cases. It begs belief that they did not organize themselves
better if they truly thought that CEO pay was excessive and damaging to
shareholder interests. They could have obtained such votes at companies
where they possessed the voting strength necessary to pass such resolutions.
It is also strange that they have not withheld votes from directors on
compensation committees who approved bad compensation arrangements on
a more sustained basis. The reluctance to exercise this option is nothing
short of shocking.
Given this record, it is unlikely that the expressive functions of the law
will be achieved unless more is done. This must come from shareholders
sanctioning institutional shareholders for failure to act. The expressive
function of the law in terms of signaling behavior that induces disapproval
also applies to institutional shareholders. If they are made to realize that
their inaction in sanctioning boards that approve bad compensation
agreements will lead to those boards being sanctioned by shareholders, they
are more likely to conform. Further, this deployment of social sanctions also
minimizes the problem of greedy CEOs trading off shame and
embarrassment against a certain sum of unmerited compensation. Such a
trade-off is not possible for institutional shareholders, and this might help to
correlate pay with performance. In this way, legislative attempts can be
restricted to facilitating the application of social sanctions primarily by
articulating desirable conduct. Shaming can decentralize the enforcement of
the norm and facilitate investor protection without the need for regulatory
expenditure.278
Even Bebchuk and Fried concede that better shareholder monitoring can
reduce compensation, writing that the presence of large (five percent or
more) shareholders has a favorable relationship with CEO compensation.279
They also write that companies with greater institutional shareholder
ownership pay CEOs less. 280 Both these factors buttress the prior point
about the need for social sanctions to be applied to ensure that norms are
internalized. The job of those who call for expressive law is not over with
the passage of legislation. Curiously, such laws might bring their inaction
into sharper focus in light of their failure to achieve behavioral change in the
absence of enforcement and norm internalization.
277. H.R. 1257, 110th Cong. (2007).
278. See supra note 242.
279. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 16, at 80-86.
280. Id.
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